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INTRODUCTION
In the ongoing case of District of Columbia v. Trump, the governments of
Washington D.C. and Maryland (the Plaintiffs) are suing Donald Trump
individually and in his official capacity as President of the United States for
violations of the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses. 1 The basis of
this lawsuit is President Trump’s continued ownership stake in the Trump
Organization.2 The Trump International Hotel is located in the Old Post
Office Building in Washington D.C. and is particularly of note to this case. 3
The Plaintiffs allege that President Trump is in violation of both
emoluments clauses because, amongst other things, the Maine delegation
and several foreign governments have stayed at the President’s Trump
International Hotel while visiting Washington D.C. to discuss issues with
the President and others in the Executive Branch.4 Recently, the court has
given a detailed explanation of the definition of emoluments in its ruling to
deny the President’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 5 An
emolument, as defined by the court, is any profit, gain or advantage that an
official receives in addition to his or her proscribed salary.6
BACKGROUND
The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Domestic Emoluments Clause
differ slightly in ways that could become important in the case at hand. The
Foreign Emoluments Clause states that “no Person holding any Office of
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Saint Louis University School of Law
1 District of Columbia v. Trump, 2018 WL 3559027, 1 (D. Md. 2018).
2 The Trump Organization LLC and The Trump Organization, Inc. make up the Trump
organization which President Trump maintains sole or partial ownership in both entities.
These entities operate as umbrella corporations which have many other corporations,
limited liability companies, limited partnerships, and other organizations affiliated with
President Trump under them. Trump, 2018 WL 3559027 at *2.
3 Trump, 2018 WL 3559027 at 2-3.
4 Id. at 3.
5 The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Peter J. Messitte presiding.
6 Trump, 2018 WL 3559027 at 19.
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Profit or Trust . . . shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any
. . . Emolument . . . of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign
State.”7 The Domestic Emoluments Clause, in regulating the Presidents
compensation states that “he [The President] shall not receive . . . any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”8
There have been three previous cases involving a President and the
emoluments clauses. The first came in 1975, when former-President Nixon
sued for the right to have recordings, documents, records, etc. from his time
in office.9 The District Court of D.C. found that, among several other
reasons, Nixon was not entitled to the materials because the Domestic
Emoluments Clause sought to limit the profit Presidents could get from the
office and as such he had no personal right to the materials, which
undoubtedly had some value.10 In a later case brought by President Nixon
on the same issue, the same court found that the Domestic Emoluments
Clause did not apply after a Court of Appeals decision, based upon
historical precedent, held that the papers were already President Nixon’s
property.11 President Obama was also sued under the Foreign Emoluments
Clause for his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize.12 Though the claim in
this case was quickly thrown out for lack of standing,13 a Justice Department
memo makes it clear that the President was free to accept the award because
the Nobel Committee that awards the prize is not made up of a “King,
Prince, or foreign State.”14

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
9 Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F.Supp. 107, 117 (D. D.C. 1975).
10 Id. at 137.
11 Griffin v. U.S., 935 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D. D.C. 1995); See also Nixon v. U.S., 978 F.2d 1269,
1275-1276 (C.C. Cir. 1992).
12 Jones v. Obama, 2010 WL 11509096, 3 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
13 Id.
14 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPLICABILITY OF THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE AND
THE FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS ACT TO THE PRESIDENT’S RECEIPT OF
THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, 1
(2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2009/12/31/emolumentsnobel-peace.pdf.
7
8
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In the few other cases that exist where the emoluments clause is mentioned,
it does not address the issue of emoluments specifically or emoluments
issues are quickly ruled out as not being pertinent to the case at hand.15
COURT’S ANALYSIS
The President’s argument in this case is that the definition of “emoluments”
is “profits arising from an office or employ."16 The President states that this
means that an emolument is only something one can get for an official duty
and not for services rendered in an individual capacity or in the private
sector.17 The court points out that having outside groups pay the President
for official duties is bribery.18 The court further addresses the insufficiency
of this argument in stating that the founders certainly did not intend to
make bribery from a foreign government acceptable with Congressional
approval as the Foreign Emoluments Clause would do under the
President’s interpretation.19
Ultimately, the court decided to follow the Plaintiffs’ definition of
emoluments as any profit, gain, or advantage that an official receives in
addition to his proscribed salary.20 The court gives extensive reasoning
throughout the decision for conclusion.
The text of the clauses themselves support the broader definition of
emolument, particularly the use of the phrases “of any kind whatever” in
the Foreign Emoluments Clause and “any other” in the Domestic
Emoluments Clause.21 The court’s argument is that the phrases would be

See U.S. ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, 350 F.Supp.2d 80, 87 (D. D.C. 2004) (Foreign
Emoluments Clause issue about whether wearing a United Nations pin on military
uniforms constituted accepting a gift from a foreign government was denied); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866 (7th Cir.
1999); Richardson v. McCarthy, 2016 WL 9088757, *4 (D. M.D. Ga. 2016); Wolfe v.
Diguglielmo, 2008 WL 544645, *3 (D. E.D. Pa. 2008).
16 Trump, 2018 WL 3559027 at *4.
17 Id.
18 Id. at *11.
19 Id.
20 Id. at *2.
21 Trump, 2018 WL 3559027 at *10.
15
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unnecessary in the President’s interpretation, and no word can be
interpreted to be unnecessary if avoidable.22
Furthermore, the original public meaning of the word emolument at the
time of the writing of the Constitution supports the Plaintiffs’ definition. 23
Every English-language dictionary at the time of writing included the
definition put forth by the Plaintiffs, while the definition put forth by the
President is only in 8% of English-language dictionaries.24 Further evidence
supporting the Plaintiffs’ definition comes from debates at the
Constitutional Convention and in the Federalist Papers, in which Madison
specifically wrote the term “emoluments of office” when referring to gains
as related to the office.25 “Of office” would be redundant if that is what the
word already meant.26
Additionally, the court states that the constitutional purpose of the two
emoluments clauses supports the Plaintiffs’ definition of emoluments.27 The
Foreign Emoluments Clause was adopted with the concern that officials
would be open to influence from foreign governments.28 The Founders
thought it best to make a “prophylactic” rule to make sure there was not
even a small chance of such influence over government officials.29 The
Domestic Emoluments Clause was added for the similar purpose of making
sure that states are not engaged in competing for the good favor of the
President by “appealing to his avarice.”30 The President combated this
interpretation by arguing that the resulting broad definition of emoluments
could result in a situation where an officials global stock holdings could
lead to emoluments clause violations if some of the profits could be traced
to foreign governments.31 This concern, however, would likely not have a
large effect on those in office and does not outweigh the broader
constitutional concerns addressed by the definition put forth by the
Id.
Id. at *12.
24 Id.
25 Id. at *15.
26 Trump, 2018 WL 3559027 at *15.
27 Id. at *16.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. (citing The Federalist No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
31 Trump, 2018 WL 3559027 at 17.
22
23
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Plaintiffs.32 Here the President raises a “horrible result” scenario, where
government officials cannot make money from global stock holdings, that
is, at least to a certain degree, in line with what the Founders intended. The
Constitution puts more value in having officials who are clear of any direct
or indirect undue influence on the decisions they make than those same
individuals enriching themselves while in office.
Perhaps the most convincing argument the court makes is that Executive
Branch precedent and practice is “overwhelmingly consistent” with the
definition of emoluments advanced by the court.33 Though President
Trump brings up that President Reagan was able to receive his retirement
benefits from California, the court quickly notes that President Reagan had
fully earned these benefits from his time as Governor and, as such, already
had the right to them.34 Thus these were not emoluments that Reagan got
from California while he was President but part of his proscribed, deferred
compensation that he earned as Governor.35 This idea of precedent and
practice is further evidenced by the shocking dearth of emoluments cases
that have reached the courts: only three examples of cases involving a
President had occurred in 228 years between the Constitution’s ratification
and Donald Trump being elected to the Presidency.36
CONCLUSION
In the courts detailed and thorough analysis, it has presented a logical
definition of emoluments. The support for the analysis follows historical,
textual, and constitutional arguments that are unlikely to be refuted by
higher courts. In the more direct issue of the present case, this definition is
likely fatal to the President’s defense. Because this motion to dismiss was
denied and there really are not any major factual disputes, it seems likely
that the Plaintiffs will be able to establish that President Trump is in
violation of both emoluments clauses simply by The Trump International
Hotel having taken money from foreign countries and the State of Maine
on behalf of President Trump. The President’s donations of any profit the
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
34 Id. at 21-22.
35 Id.
36 See Supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
32
33
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hotel claimed to make37 seems irrelevant under the definition advanced by
the court because the clauses use the words “accepting” and “receiving.”38
What he does with the profits after receiving or accepting them likely does
not absolve him of this violation. How the President will respond if this case
is lost and all appeals are exhausted is not clear, but it could potentially
result in a constitutional crisis in which the President is defying an order
from the courts if he refuses to divest himself of ownership in the Trump
Organization. However, what is clear for now is that an emolument as it
relates to the Constitution is officially defined as any profit, gain or
advantage that an official receives in addition to his or her proscribed
salary.39

Edited by Carter Gage

David A. Fahrenthold and Jonathan O’Connell, Trump Organization says it has
donated foreign profits to U.S. Treasury, but declines to share details, The Washington
Post (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-organization-saysit-has-donated-foreign-profits-to-us-treasury-but-declines-to-sharedetails/2018/02/26/747522e0-1b22-11e8-ae5a16e60e4605f3_story.html?utm_term=.5376f6bad278
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
39 Trump, 2018 WL 3559027 at 19.
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